A Life RAFT or Just Treading Water?: Eviction Assistance Program Applications in Summary Process Actions
by Vladimir L. Nechev and David A. Brown
Introduction
When residential tenants do not prevail in summary process actions, they and their families face eviction and its myriad related harms. In a time of widespread housing unaffordability and instability, the aggregate impact of evictions pose severe challenges for the Commonwealth as a whole. With the goal of ameliorating the various effects of these displacements, the Legislature created several rental assistance programs, including Rental Assistance for Families in Transition (“RAFT”) and HomeBase, which are designed to deliver payment of rental arrears, and, in certain cases, future rental payments, directly to landlords to incentivize them to forego evictions and preserve tenancies.
Unfortunately, the process of accessing these programs can take time, and such delays can cause direct tension with a residential housing court eviction process that is intended to be, as its name suggests, “summary.” Recognizing the conflict between the important policy goal of preventing homelessness and the goal of resolving eviction disputes through timely court proceedings, in July 2023, the Legislature enacted G.L. c. 239, § 15 (“Section 15”) mandating a pause in certain eviction actions to accommodate tenants’ applications for housing assistance programs. While the language of Section 15 appears simple, there is an active debate as to whether the pause is mandatory and whether it conflicts with another portion of the statute, G.L. c. 239, § 3 (“Section 3”), which describes landlords’ rights. Section 3, which had been enacted in July 2021, gives landlords a choice: they may either agree to accept full payment to end the eviction action, or they may refuse payment and recover possession of the rental property. The tension with Section 15 has arisen because even when landlords have opted not to accept full payment, courts have still granted tenants stays during the pendency of assistance applications—leading landlords to ask whether an application is made in good faith if the tenant is already aware that the landlord will not be accepting any payment assistance that the tenant is ultimately awarded. This article presents two contrasting views of the requirements of Section 15 in light of the rights granted landlords in Section 3.
A Clear Mandate for a Pause in Proceedings
by David A. Brown
The language of Section 15 is not discretionary and is not in conflict with Section 3. The Legislature spoke clearly when it provided that a court “shall” . . . “(i) grant a continuance; . . . (ii) issue a stay of execution; and (iii) not enter judgment or issue an execution” while there is a pending application for rental assistance. Summary Process for Possession of Land Act, G.L. c. 239, § 15(b). There are no exceptions to the stay, nor can any be read into its clear language. As the Supreme Judicial Court recently explained, “the Legislature’s use of the word ‘shall’ reflects the imposition of a nondiscretionary, mandatory obligation.” Garcia v. Exec. Off. of Hous. & Livable Communities, 495 Mass. 86, 91 (2024) (enforcing a mandate that the state provide emergency shelter to seemingly eligible families). This is consistent with the statutory construction axiom that “the word ‘shall’ is an imperative.” Perez v. Dep’t of State Police, 491 Mass 474, 486 (2023).
Enforcement of this mandatory pause is not in conflict with Section 3 and does not produce an absurd result. See, e.g., Sch. Comm. of Newton v. Newton Sch. Custodians Ass’n, 438 Mass. 739, 750-51 (2003) (“In the absence of explicit legislative commands to the contrary, we construe statutes to harmonize and not to undercut each other.”). The two provisions are directed at two distinct subjects: Section 15 is directed at and clarifies an obligation of the court (i.e., to issue a stay until a decision on the rental assistance application); by contrast, Section 3 is directed at and clarifies the obligations of a landlord-plaintiff in a non-payment summary process action (i.e., that the plaintiff need not ultimately accept the funds). Both propositions can coexist in harmony: a landlord need not accept rental assistance after judgment in a non-payment case; however, the landlord may not proceed with removing the tenant from the property until the rental assistance application is decided.
Even if there were a conflict, Section 15 would still control because it was enacted after Section 3. See Boston Hous. Auth. v. Lab. Rels. Comm’n, 398 Mass. 715, 718 (1986) (later-enacted legislation supersedes earlier legislation). And the legislative history of Section 15 makes clear that in passing Section 15 more than three years after enacting an earlier version, Chapter 257 of the Acts of 2020 (“An Act Providing for Eviction Protection During the COVID-19 Pandemic Emergency”)—which first permitted stays pending rental assistance applications—it was aware of landlords’ frustration with delays caused by the rental assistant application process, but nonetheless chose to retain in Section 15 the mandatory “shall” language without limitation or qualification. This was a recognition of a somber reality: the Commonwealth continues to face a crisis of widespread housing instability. Between 2022 and 2023, the total homeless population in Massachusetts increased by 23.4%, and family homelessness increased by 29.1%. See U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, The 2023 Annual Homelessness Assessment Report (AHAR) to Congress, 44-45 (2023).
Housing costs are skyrocketing and the state is devoting an ever-increasing amount of funds toward shelter expenses. Appropriations for the Emergency Assistance Family Shelter system in fiscal year 2024 were more than 4½ times those for fiscal year 2021. Chris Lisinski, Colin A. Young, & Michael P. Norton, “Massachusetts legislators approve more shelter funding, new limits,” New England Public Media, (Apr. 25, 2024); see also, e.g., Karen Bobadilla & William Lonn, Preserving Massachusetts’ Right to Shelter in the Context of Increased Migration, 69.1 Bos. Bar J. 14, 15 (Winter 2025). In response to the crisis, the Legislature intentionally created a temporary pause in the displacement process and sought to incentivize landlords to maintain the tenancies of individuals who had fallen behind in their rent, even in scenarios where the landlord has already obtained a judgment for possession.
Disagreement has also arisen as to whether a tenant is entitled to a continuance in the context of what some have called “serial filing” of rental assistant applications. Some landlord advocates have suggested that no pause should apply in the case of serial tenant filings because such applications are not “made in good faith.” But the legislative history of the statute demonstrates that this “good faith” requirement was intentionally excluded from the law. State Senator Lydia Edwards (D-Third Suffolk) proposed, and the Senate ratified, an amendment adding the clause “made in good faith” after the word “application,” but that language was specifically removed by the Conference Committee and not included in the final bill, clearly evidencing an intent by the Legislature not to impose that requirement and instead maintain a stay provision that is as broad as possible. See Proposed Amendment 176 to Section 35 of budget proposal, Massachusetts Senate Journal, May 23, 2023.
The mandatory nature of this statutory stay and the lack of conflict between these statutes was recently affirmed by 92 Grand St. Commons, LLC v. Oliveras, No. 25-J-0064, slip op. (App. Ct. Feb. 10, 2025), in which a Single Justice held that “while the plaintiff is not required to accept the rental assistance funds and reinstate the defendant’s tenancy, § 15 nonetheless requires the issuance of stay ‘if the [statutory] requirements are met.’” Id. at 4 (finding that Section 15 requires a stay of execution where there is a pending rental assistance application notwithstanding that a judgment had already entered). See also Isabayo v. Cariglia, No. 25-J-335, slip op. (App. Ct. May 12, 2025) (granting stay due to pending application); Fakhory v. Brozowski, No. 25-J-327, slip op. (App. Ct. May 14, 2025) (same). The harmonization of these two provisions makes clear that a stay should occur in such circumstances to achieve the Legislature’s goal.
When Statutes Meet Reality: An Unworkable Conflict
by Vladimir L. Nechev
While there may be no direct textual conflict between Sections 3 and 15 of G.L. c. 239, these sections, when read together, create a conflict in their practical application that courts cannot ignore. The plain language of Section 15, considered in isolation, suggests a clear mandate: if there is a pending rental assistance application, the court shall neither issue the execution nor enter judgment (depending on the stage of litigation) and shall grant a continuance at its discretion. While reading this section on its own would suggest that a tenant is permitted an unlimited number of continuances based on repetitive rental assistance applications, such an outcome would create an untenable result that is not in accord with other portions of the same statute and undermines the intention of the Legislature. Massachusetts case law is clear that sections of the same chapter must be “interpreted so as to constitute an harmonious and consistent body of laws.” See Johnson v. Johnson, 425 Mass. 693, 696 (1997).
As such, Section 15 must be read in harmony with other sections of Chapter 239, specifically, Section 3, which states that a landlord shall not be required to accept payment from a tenant even if that payment represents full satisfaction of the judgment. Even if the plain language of Section 15 seems to allow unlimited continuances or delays so long as there is a pending rental assistance application, the countervailing language of Section 3 of the same statute appears to limit these continuances, as a landlord is not required to accept funds to cure the rental balance post-judgment. Reading these two sections together limits a post-judgment continuance or stay due to a pending rental assistance application to situations where a landlord is willing to participate in the application, as landlord participation is required for a rental assistance application to be approved. This makes sense: tenants should not be permitted to apply for funding that landlords have stated they will not accept; landlords who chose to simply recover possession under Section 3 should not be made to wait for the resolution of an application that will not continue the tenancy.
To add to the interplay between Section 3 and Section 15, recent Appeals Court rulings seem to suggest that a stay under Section 15 is limited to the one rental assistance application pending when the stay was requested. See 92 Grand Street Commons, LLC, No. 2025-J-0064 (holding that “[t]o the extent the defendant seeks to stay this matter further while awaiting decisions on her appeal from the denial of that application and the additional applications she has filed, such request requires an interpretation of the statute that, as the Housing Court judge recognized, would result in an unworkable and prolonged delay”). Allowing a tenant to submit an unlimited number of rental assistance applications, and appeals thereof, and request unlimited stays under Section 15 essentially forces the landlord to forfeit possession indefinitely, resulting in severe prejudice and irreparable loss. Id. Such a result would have the effect of severely undermining the Summary Process Rules and Chapter 239, both of which contemplate expeditious proceedings that recognize property owners’ interests while providing protections for tenants. Unlimited stays simply create an unjust result for landlords.
Reading these two statutes together makes clear that the Legislature enacted Section 15 in part because it was aware that a sister provision, Section 3, was a de facto pre-existing backstop. Courts should adopt this straightforward interpretation and avoid an absurd result that would reward perpetual, and even bad faith, applications. Doing otherwise would have the perverse incentive of rewarding unmeritorious applications to already overburdened housing programs, reducing the resources for agencies to support meritorious applications and further overburdening the housing system’s administrative functions—a result that certainly is not what the Legislature intended.
David A. Brown is a staff attorney at Community Legal Aid of Central and Western Massachusetts.
Vladimir L. Nechev is a partner at Scolnick Laverty & Gouveia, LLP.
